The cumulative effects of anxiety, fatigue and vessel motion from heavy weather degraded the crew’s decision making and physical performance of duties during the fateful voyage, according to a report from the Coast Guard’s Marine Board of Investigation.
Exactly two years after the October 2015 sinking of the TOTE Maritime general cargo ship El Faro, a final report from the U.S. Coast Guard’s Marine Board of Investigation (MBI) has found that there is plenty of blame to go around when it comes to the determining factors in the incident, which claimed the lives of all 33 people on board.
According to the MBI report, mistakes made by the captain of the El Faro were the primary reason the vessel was caught in then-category 3 storm Hurricane Joaquin, lost propulsion and sank while en route from Jacksonville, Fla. to Puerto Rico on Oct. 1, 2015.
“The cumulative effects of anxiety, fatigue, and vessel motion from heavy weather degraded the crew’s decision making and physical performance of duties during the accident voyage,” the 199-page USCG report states in part.
The U.S.-flagged El Faro was a 40-year-old combination roll-on/roll-off (ro-ro) and lift-on/lift-off (lo-lo) cargo ship crewed by 28 American merchant mariners, who were employed by TOTE Maritime, a subsidiary of Seattle-based Saltchuk. In addition, five Polish repair yard workers were on board at the time of the incident, headed to San Juan to carry out vessel repairs and maintenance. The 791-foot, 14,971 deadweight-ton (dwt) vessel was carrying a cargo of 391 shipping containers.
As Hurricane Joaquin gained strength, El Faro’s captain directed the ship southward and away from the regular, direct course to Puerto Rico. The deviation ultimately steered the vessel almost directly into toward the hurricane, the MBI report found.
As a result of the heavy rains and wind, the vessel sustained a prolonged tilt on her starboard side and began taking on water. Around 7 a.m. on the day the vessel sank, El Faro had lost propulsion and was suffering uncontrolled flooding when the captain notified his employer, TOTE Maritime, of the distress using the vessel’s satellite distress system and ordered the crew to abandon ship.
At the time, the vessel was near the eye of the hurricane, which had strengthened to a Category 3 storm, the USCG report states.
A search-and-rescue operation was launched, and after the hurricane conditions lessened, El Faro debris and one deceased member of the 33-person crew were found. No survivors were found during the entirety of the search-and-rescue operations.
On Oct. 31, 2015, a U.S. Navy surface asset, using side-scan sonar, located the main wreckage of El Faro at a depth of over 15,000 feet. El Faro’s voyage data recorder was recovered from the debris on Aug. 15, 2016. It contained 26 hours of bridge audio recordings as well as other critical navigation data that were used to help determine the circumstances leading up to the incident.
In its report, the MBI cast blame on all involved, including the captain, crew and owners of the vessel, stating that, among other things:
• TOTE Maritime and the vessel’s captain did not adequately identify the risk of heavy weather when preparing, evaluating and approving the voyage plan prior to departure on the accident voyage;
• TOTE, the ship’s captain and its officers were not aware of vessel vulnerabilities and operating limitations in heavy weather conditions;
• TOTE did not provide the tools and protocols for accurate weather observations, and as a result, the captain and navigation crew did not adequately or accurately assess and report observed weather conditions;
• And TOTE did not provide adequate support and oversight to the crew of El Faro during the accident voyage.
The chair of the USCG’s Marine Board of Investigation, Capt. Jason Neubauer, recommended in the report that the Jacksonville USCG take action to penalize TOTE for multiple infractions, including failure to comply with work-rest requirements for El Faro crew members on multiple dates prior to the accident voyage; failure to comply with emergency procedures; failure to notify the Coast Guard of repairs to lifesaving equipment that were conducted just prior to the vessel’s departure from Jacksonville on the ill-fated voyage; and failure to notify the USCG of repairs to El Faro’s main propulsion boiler less than a week before the voyage.
The MBI, however, did not recommend any criminal prosecution of any person or entity, nor did it recommend any suspension or revocation action against any credentialed mariner.
“The most important thing to remember is that 33 people lost their lives in this tragedy,” Neubauer said in a statement leading up to the release of the report. “If adopted, we believe the safety recommendations in our report will improve safety of life at sea.”
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is expected to meet in Washington, D.C. on Dec. 12 to discuss contributing factors to the sinking and consider recommendations for addressing safety issues uncovered during the investigation.
USCG report blames El Faro sinking on vessel captain, crew and owner
