Pirate Busters
Are private security contractors the best form of vessel protection?
By Eric Kulisch
Pirate attacks on commercial vessels in the Gulf of Aden and off the eastern coast of Somalia are expected to spike again as the end of the monsoon season in September ushers in calmer weather.
Wind strengths of 18 knots and waves above 6.5 feet are considered enough to usually deter pirates who operate in small skiffs.
Last year 111 ships were attacked off the coast of Somalia and 42 were successfully captured out of more than 21,000 ship transits. That translates into one in 500 ships, or 0.2 percent, that are taken hostage. Ship owners paid about $100 million in ransom to get ships and crews released. There were as many attacks by May of this year as all of 2008.
Although a few multinational naval task forces and vessels from individual nations continue to patrol the region to deter and defend against pirates, commercial vessel operators are primarily responsible for protecting themselves at sea.
Shipping industry officials say the most vulnerable ships, based on previous patterns of successful pirate attacks:
' Travel at low speed.
' Have low freeboard (distance from waterline to main open deck).
' Have inadequate response planning and procedures in place.
' Do not maintain a high state of alert or signal that they have self-protective capabilities.
' Are slow to respond to an attack.
Most attempted ship raids have been repulsed by crews, who have planned, trained and employed passive counter measures such as zig-zag maneuvers, fire hoses, night vision optics, transiting at night and even dummies posted at the rails to simulate additional lookouts.
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| 'Many ocean carriers are betting on the low odds of pirate attack rather than spending heavily on security measures because the shiping industry, which has modest margins even in the best of times is being ravaged by the global recession and low rates.' | |
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Some vessel operators have employed unarmed ' and in a few instances, armed ' security forces to help set up defensive tactics and repulse attacks while transiting the region. Most operators are reluctant to use armed security because of liability concerns if a guard injures or kills someone, a maze of differing firearms restrictions among international ports, and a potential for more violent pirate responses.
The U.S. government should press other flag-nations to ensure that ocean carriers comply with the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code and adopt best security practices, according to a recent report on piracy from the Heritage Foundation.
In May, the U.S. Coast Guard issued a security directive requiring U.S.-flagged vessels to conduct risk assessments of their vessels, develop anti-piracy plans, and establish communications with military forces in the area. The sea service recommended the use of several non-lethal precautions and that the industry should consider supplementing crews with armed or unarmed security personnel.
Many ocean carriers are betting on the low odds of pirate attack rather than spending heavily on security measures because the shipping industry, which has modest margins even in the best of times, is being ravaged by the global recession and low rates.
Nonetheless, for carriers operating around the Gulf of Aden costs have risen through higher insurance premiums, higher fuel costs and fewer revenue-making trips for the limited number of tankers and other high-risk vessels sent around Africa rather than through the Suez Canal short cut, and ransoms in the $1 million to $2 million range for captured ships.
One tactic companies have neglected so far is to hire private security vessels to serve as a 'picket' for commercial shipping.
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Private escorts could interdict pirate ships, chase them away from commercial vessels and then prevent the attack skiffs from rejoining their mother ship by using non-lethal means to incapacitate or deter the pirate craft, the Heritage Foundation report said, without any reference to the potential cost of such an option compared to onboard security.
Private security firms Glenn Defence Marine Asia and Background Asia Risk Solutions, in particular, provided vessel escorts during the height of the piracy scourge in the busy Straits of Malacca, according to Patrick Cullen, an expert on private military companies. Piracy has markedly declined there since 2005 after the littoral states ' Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore ' made a concerted effort with help from the international community to beef up ocean and air security patrols.
Blackwater USA, the notorious private security firm that recently changed its name to Xe Services LLC, saw a business opportunity to protect cargo vessels in the Gulf of Aden and two years ago invested in a security ship and crew. It bought and refurbished a 40-year-old National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration vessel outfitted with inflatable speed boats with rigged hulls, hand-launched unmanned aerial vehicles and a landing pad capable of handling a couple of small helicopters for surveillance and forward defense.
The venture was shut down because of lack of interest from ship owners, partly due to costs; ship owners' reluctance to do business with a security contractor whose armed guards were accused of using excessive force in several deadly incidents in Iraq; and the fact that its ship, the McArthur, was too slow and couldn't keep up with the vessels it needed to escort, according to insurance and private security industry experts.
French security firm Secopex also provides armed onboard security teams and vessel escorts, according to its Web site.
Escorting ships is a traditional state navy responsibility. International forces have set up patrolled transit lanes in the Gulf of Aden and offered a limited number of scheduled escorts through the waterway.
The lack of demand for security boats to shadow cargo ships is a function of the available naval presence and the relatively small number of attacks, said Claude Berube, an instructor in the political science division at the U.S. Naval Academy, in an interview.
Private escort ships can provide armed security hundreds or thousands of meters from the vessel, eliminating having armed riders onboard, which ship operators believe could escalate violence and threaten their ships, crews and insurance rates.
But the escort ships are not a viable option unless pirate attacks substantially increase or naval force protection decreases, Berube said. At that point, shipping companies would have to undertake a cost-benefit analysis to see whether a guard ship was worthwhile.
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| The U.S. government significantly increased its focus on Somali pirate attacks after the U.S.-flag Maresk Alabama was hijacked and required a military rescue of its captain last spring. |
'I don't think the level of piracy has reached the level where private escort ships would be affordable to private shipping companies. So there's the theoretical aspect and then there's the practical application,' he said.
And for-hire gunboats calling at regional ports to resupply experience the same problems with differing firearms restrictions that discourage commercial ocean carriers and private yachts from carrying weapons onboard, added Berube, a Navy reservist who conducted anti-pirate operations while on active duty.
One of the ways some security firms deal with the restrictive firearms laws is to dump their weapons over the side before entering a port at the end of their tour, said Cullen, who is now teaching at the Barcelona Institute for International Studies.
Another best practice recommended by the Heritage Foundation's Maritime Security Working Group is for vessel operators to install alternative detection technologies, such as long-range high-definition camera systems that can track smaller, fast-moving targets. These systems would compensate for the limitations of navigation radars.
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| Carafano |
Many other recommendations in the report reflect consensus positions heard often in the press. Few of the 20 members, aside from lead author James Carafano, have notable naval or maritime industry experience, especially as it pertains to piracy. Carafano is a former Army officer who has garnered a reputation for being knowledgeable about a broad range of defense and homeland security matters in his role as a senior research fellow at Heritage.
The Heritage Foundation report also called for the United States to increase the size of Navy and Coast Guard fleets to have the resources to police hot spots around the world in addition to performing traditional missions. Over time, the Coast Guard should replace the Navy as the primary service tasked with combating piracy, because it is better suited to deal with maritime law enforcement issues and assist regional allies in building up their own coast guards and maritime security programs, it said.
As part of that capacity-building effort, the United States should help establish a regional joint maritime patrol to combat piracy and provide equipment and training to regional allies, including the sale of Littoral Combat Ships, unmanned aerial vehicles and electronic intelligence-sharing systems to Saudi Arabia, the report said.
Congress has increased funding for the Coast Guard in recent years, but the money is still far short of the amount needed for modernization and its expanded homeland security mission since 9/11. Heritage, a pro-defense think tank, urged Congress to accelerate the Coast Guard's investment schedule by providing $2.5 billion a year so that aging cutters, aircraft and other equipment are replaced within 10 years instead of 20.
The reduction of U.S. and European naval fleets during the past 20 years puts a premium on collaboration among naval forces, naval experts say. Coordination among the various international task forces and national missions in the region has improved during the past 18 months, but there are still differences in rules of engagement, command-and-control, capabilities and standard operating procedures that limit the effectiveness of the various efforts.
The Heritage report said a joint naval force, working through the United Nations, should blockade Somali and other ports known as pirate refuges, to help dry up local popular support for pirates and obtain intelligence on their activities.
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| 'If piracy were occurring on or near U.S. waters there'd be a lot more resources thrown at it.' | |
| Stephen Caldwell director of maritime security and Coast Guard issues, U.S. Government Accountability office. |
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It also recommended the U.S. Treasury Department impose sanctions on financial institutions linked to piracy, or prohibit insurance claims on ransom paid to pirates because indemnifying ship owners for ransoms creates an incentive for more hijackings.
It is against the law for insurance companies to directly pay claims for ransoms, but ship owners often take out an extra Kidnap and Ransom (K&R) policy over their normal marine insurance to cover such contingencies.
Insurance companies have recently produced new K&R policies specifically for maritime piracy and kidnapping, according to Michael Frodl, a Washington-based attorney who works with specialty insurance companies. The new policies cost about $30,000 per transit for up to $3 million in coverage and include reimbursement for legal and security costs, but have not caught on with ocean carriers yet, he said.
A condition of traditional or new K&R policies is that the customer can't let anyone, including the crew, know about the coverage so that pirates don't target ships for their guaranteed insurance payout.
Frodl said any attempt to restrict K&R policies would be met with stiff resistance from the insurance and shipping industries.
The United States and Britain have mounted modest efforts to trace ransom payments through the financial system to their recipients without notable results.
Officials agree that the root cause of the piracy problem is the lack of a central governing authority in Somalia since 1991. The Transitional Federal Government now in place controls little of the country and does not have popular legitimacy.
The Heritage report suggested that the international community should help legitimate tribal and other authorities without links to terrorism or piracy to encourage a bottom-up governance structure.
Last spring, Somali Prime Minister Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke offered to share information on pirate leaders it has identified with the United States and other countries in exchange for combat resources. The government presented a plan to U.S., European Union and other diplomats to build up military forces and establish intelligence-gathering posts along its coastline to prevent pirates from heading to sea, the Associated Press reported.
The Heritage report and other experts acknowledge that vital U.S. national interests are not at stake because the U.S. merchant fleet is so small and represents a tiny amount of traffic around the Horn of Africa. There are only two or three U.S.-flag vessels operating in the eastern Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden at any given time, typically hauling U.S. food aid to countries such as Kenya, or carrying U.S. military cargo under contract with the Military Sealift Command. The U.S. Navy places armed marines onboard vessels carrying military cargo. The U.S. government significantly increased its focus on Somali pirate attacks after the U.S.-flag ship Maersk Alabama was hijacked and required a military rescue of its captain last spring.
The primary threat from not effectively dealing with Somali pirates is that their successful tactics could be 'exported' to other regions and used by other state and non-state actors against U.S. economic and security interests, security experts say.
They are concerned that piracy could then morph into maritime kidnapping where the crew, rather than the vessel, is the prize possession and is spirited ashore into dangerous hideouts that make rescue all but impossible, Frodl said. Somali pirates can park captured vessels in Somali waters without fear of retribution because there is no viable Somali authority and international forces will not enter territorial waters. Other countries are not likely to allow the same level of operational freedom to rebels or criminal gangs, who are more likely to extract crewmembers from the ship and infiltrate them into places onshore that are inhospitable to Westerners.
'The fear is that criminal gangs will recognize that people in the shipping business will pay serious money to get their crews back,' he said.
Stephen Caldwell, director of maritime security and Coast Guard issues for the U.S. Government Accountability Office, seconded the notion that aggressively fighting piracy or helping to rebuild Somalia is not a required action but a policy choice.
But he questioned the need for a global constabulary maritime force beyond existing Navy and Coast Guard capabilities, saying there is not much insecurity in the maritime domain besides the Gulf of Aden and the Caribbean, where drug running and illegal immigration are the primary concerns.
The idea that the Coast Guard should take the lead in any piracy mission makes sense in that the sea service may have some legal authority or experience that gives it an advantage over the Navy in terms of arresting people and gathering evidence for prosecution. But taking on such a role would also require a logistics capability that it currently doesn't have, Caldwell said at a Heritage discussion forum in mid-July.
The best tools to fight pirates may be small patrol boats, and 'these assets don't have very long legs' considering they have a three-day range out of U.S. ports, the analyst said. Operating Coast Guard units on a regular basis in the Indian Ocean or elsewhere would require development of a new resupply system or even maritime stations to support remote forces.
Caldwell, who works for the watchdog arm of Congress, also said lawmakers don't have the appetite to increase spending on the Coast Guard's Deepwater modernization program, especially considering the Obama administration's long-range budget plan essentially flatlines the Department of Homeland Security's budget during the next 10 years.
Congressmen and senators want new Coast Guard resources directed to local maritime safety and search-and-rescue capabilities, although the House version of the DHS appropriations bill includes $241 million to cover Coast Guard overseas deployments, including operations in the Persian Gulf and against pirates off the Somalia Coast. In previous years, the money was included in Defense Department funding and transferred to the sea service.
'Most are more worried about keeping their own ports safe with a Coast Guard that's more domestically based than they are with pirates going after a ship that is not U.S.-flagged and not U.S.-owned,' Caldwell said. 'If piracy were occurring on or near U.S. waters there'd be a lot more resources thrown at it.'
The Coast Guard itself has gone on record against any acceleration of the fleet-building program because it is still having difficulty taking over as lead systems integrator from gaffe-prone contractors and building up its contract management staff to oversee the project. The Deepwater program has been plagued by huge cost overruns and new vessels that had to be repaired because they didn't work.
It will take at least five more years before the Coast Guard realizes the full capability of the new National Security Cutters, Caldwell said. Contractors originally said that eight new cutters could do the work of 12 legacy vessels because they would have unmanned aerial vehicles and small boats to increase surveillance and patrol range, but those systems won't be fully assimilated until 2015, Caldwell predicted.
The piracy situation provides a potential opportunity to develop small boat tracking systems, the GAO official said. U.S. maritime authorities can easily track large vessels offshore, but DHS has listed small boat attacks on critical infrastructure as a top area of concern. Caldwell said anti-piracy operations could serve as a test bed for small vessel tracking technologies.
Another silver lining is the Somali pirate threat has increased coordination among navies that normally don't work together. U.S. Navy officials say the level of engagement has reached levels never seen before and may pay off in the future when dealing with other crises, according to Caldwell.
'The reality is we're going to have smaller navies, but perhaps we can leverage them better' and team with the Coast Guard to achieve the same results as a single large force, he said.
The GAO plans to begin an analysis of the piracy situation later this year.