The United States Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation yesterday held the first day of hearings into the sinking of the TOTE Maritime Puerto Rico general cargo ship.
The captain of the ill-fated TOTE Maritime Puerto Rico general cargo vessel El Faro did not need to seek permission from the company in order to change course due to weather or any other mitigating circumstances, according to Philip Morrell, vice president of Marine Operations Commercial for sister company TOTE Services.
The United States Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation yesterday held the first day of hearings into the loss of the El Faro, which sank Oct. 1 near Crooked Island Bahamas after sailing into the path of Hurrican Joaquin, claiming the lives of the 33 people on board. The MBI spent over six hours interviewing Morrell, asking him questions on a broad range of topics from TOTE management structure, the suitability of the El Faro’s captain and crew, the ship’s general condition, and company safety policies and procedures surrounding inclement weather.
As VP of Marine Operations Commercial for TOTE Services, Morrell is primarily responsible for oversight of the maintenance and repair of TOTE-operated vessels, as well as construction of newbuild ships.
According to Morrell, who seemed nervous and unsure throughout his testimony, TOTE Maritime Puerto Rico and TOTE Services have no direct say in the specific routes taken by their vessels, nor in how the cargo is loaded. Ultimate responsibility for all of those functions, Morrell said, lies with the captain, also known as the “master,” of the ship.
For the Jacksonville to Puerto Rico trade on which the El Faro served, there is one primary route, referred to as the Atlantic route, and two secondary passages, called the Tropics Channel and the Bahamas Channel.
Capt. Mark Davidson, master of the El Faro at the time of the incident, had sent an e-mail to Morrell and other TOTE executives prior to the ship sinking specifically asking permission to transit the Bahamas Channel on the northbound section of what would be the ship’s last voyage.
“Question: I would like to transit the old Bahamas Channel on return NB leg?” Davidson wrote in an e-mail dated Sept. 30, 10:22 a.m.
Despite Morrell’s continued assertion that this was not required – he said ship masters are only obliged to inform TOTE of changes to the ship’s schedule so that they can coordinate landside terminal operations – MBI pointed to another e-mail in which a TOTE executive “authorized” the change in course. Morrell said those e-mails function as a one-way notification system and not as an actual request, however, and that the other TOTE executive was merely being “professional” and responded as such out of “common courtesy.”
Throughout the hearing, it was clear that TOTE management is continuing to distance itself from responsibility for the decisions that led to the tragic accident, while the MBI is trying to draw a connection between the actions of the master and possible influence from the company.
Morrell said repeatedly that the ultimate responsibility for decisions regarding vessel routing, as well as cargo stowage plans and safety equipment onboard TOTE ships, lies with the ship’s captain and crew.
The 10-day Marine Board of Investigation hearings are open to the public and the Coast Guard will be tweeting live updates from @uscoastguard under the hashtags #CGMBI and #Elfaro. Interested parties may ask questions or make comments via the e-mail address ELFARO@uscg.mil, and the proceedings proceedings may also be viewed via a live stream hosted by the Coast Guard.
TOTE: El Faro captain did not need permission to alter course
