Hong Kong terminals seek DHS blessing for automated inspection system
Terminal operators in Hong Kong are pressing the Department of Homeland Security to decide whether an integrated system designed to inspect every international container that enters a port and help customs officials verify the contents prior to vessel departure meets requirements for reducing the threat of terrorists using a containerized weapon to attack the United States, according to industry officials familiar with the program.
Almost one year after launching an extensive test to automatically capture x-ray type images and radiation readings of every container shipment transferred by truck or barge, the Hong Kong Container Terminal Operators Association has set a deadline this fall for the department to give a concrete signal about whether the privately funded initiative would provide useful data for increasing the speed and accuracy of overseas inspection programs.
The group recently contacted Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff and proposed sharing data files from the container screening to assist U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers stationed in foreign ports under the Container Security Initiative (CSI) in inspecting suspicious containers without taking them to a dedicated exam site outside the terminal.
The outreach follows comments in May by security specialist Stephen Flynn, who has championed the program, that the terminals planned to abandon the project by the end of summer because they was reluctant to pass on the cost of the investment to shippers without a clear mandate from the United States that the data would be used to provide an extra layer of security.
The project may be gaining some momentum after Senate hearings and a harsh report by the General Accountability Office shined unfavorable light on CSI and a program that offers customs incentives to importers that tighten security controls along their international supply networks. Also working in the project's favor is the fact that Chertoff declared supply chain security a top priority following a comprehensive review of departmental operations, and indicated that he wanted more complete global supply chain data to develop a more accurate profile about the cargo in each container.
Chertoff has also talked about the importance of the private sector taking its share of responsibility for securing networks and infrastructure under its control.
Faced with strong skepticism in Congress about the effectiveness of its supply chain and cargo security programs, DHS appears ready to take a second look at the project after months of inaction.
DHS has been working with the Hong Kong terminals 'and we are certainly encouraged by their effort to take it (security) to the next level' spokesman Jarrod Agen said. 'We are continuing to work with them and provide input going forward,' but no formal commitment to the project has been made, he said. Department officials want to make sure that 'they have the most accurate assessment' of the project before making a decision about its utility, said Agen, who confirmed that the terminal group had communicated with Chertoff.
The terminals have invited Chertoff to Hong Kong to see the pilot project within three months. Staff members from the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs subcommittee are scheduled to visit Hong Kong project in late August, according to Flynn and another hearing is planned in the fall.
The proposed method of physically screening each container at the port of embarkation runs counter to the U.S. strategy of prescreening commercial shipping data and using risk-management techniques to filter out legitimate cargo, and target inspections on a narrow universe of containers that raise red-flags about their origin or potential to be compromised in transit to the port. The government is implementing a policy to inspect 100 percent of cargo for nuclear or radiological weapons of mass destruction by deploying drive-through radiation detection portals at all ports of entry, and working to get foreign allies to install similar machines to conduct radiation checks on outbound containers. But DHS has sharply rejected calls to run high levels of containers through image-detection machines because the technology has much more limited throughput and would cause significant delays to the flow of commerce.
But the Hong Kong terminal operators say they have successfully shown that they can detect for radiation and take container-penetrating cargo images as containers are driven into the port or shuttled off a barge at the same time without requiring separate processes. The two container security technologies are part of an integrated pedestal system developed by San-Diego-based systems integrator Science Applications International Corp. (SAIC) that combines gamma ray imaging, radiation detection equipment, video cameras and optical character recognition technology to capture the container ID number at an estimated cost of $6.50 per container. The system scans every container that passes through the test entrance at Hong Kong International Terminals and Modern Terminals on trucks traveling at an average rate of 15 kilometers per hour (see September 2004 and July 2005 American Shipper).
The Hong Kong team has nearly 300,000 container scans for cargo that was shipped to the United States, according to Flynn and Gary Gilbert, director of port security at Hutchison Port Holdings, which operates the Hong Kong International Terminals.
In addition to an upfront inspection capability, the system gives law enforcement and intelligence agencies an ability to quickly investigate the source of a potential supply chain security breach that led to a terrorist attack, close any gaps and possibly capture the perpetrators.
Gilbert likened the system to the closed caption TV cameras that monitor a wide swath of London and helped police quickly track the source of the recent train and bus bombings.
That type of capability would help international trade by allowing governments to keep ports operating in the wake of an attack, because they could identify the source of the breakdown rather than having to shut down ports until an exhaustive physical exam of every container and transport system could be conducted, Flynn has argued.
Flynn said he advised the Hong Kong operators to go ahead with the project without any upfront government support because DHS was more likely to support a proven process over a white paper concept.
'You have to show them that you have confidence in the system,' Flynn said. 'It's a chicken-and-egg scenario. If you've had some success then they'll take a look and it's much easier to change the conversation.'
The terminal operators have made it clear they are not asking for U.S. grants or appropriations to fund the program. They have absorbed the costs so far, but say they eventually need to pass on the costs to their customers, which will be difficult to justify unless CBP shows shippers there is a clear benefit by agreeing to use the data generated by the system.
But official response has been slow to develop.
Flynn and project organizers briefed CBP Commissioner Robert Bonner, former DHS Secretary Tom Ridge and then-deputy James Loy last November, after which CBP sent two separate teams to Hong Kong to observe the system. Bonner told American Shipper in May he expected to soon receive an evaluation of the program, but expressed skepticism about the concept of inspecting every container.
The Hong Kong terminal operators and systems developer SAIC never got any feedback from CBP about whether they were on the right track or whether to make modifications to better meet the agency's needs, Flynn said when reached by cell phone Thursday.
Flynn testified during the Senate hearing that CBP officials are ambivalent about embracing new technologies to confirm that low-risk shippers and transport providers are actually low-risk because it calls into question their strategy of focusing on high-risk parties. CBP is also reluctant to receive more data that they can analyze because it might be blamed after a terrorist incident for failing to act on data in its possession.
But Flynn said CBP could use the radiation and cargo screening data to augment its targeting process. Images and readings of every container would be captured as the container entered the port facility, but CBP or local customs authorities could just analyze the data on containers they have identified as potentially high-risk based on shipping manifests and other intelligence.
The Hong Kong terminal operators say this would be a boon to shippers because it would eliminate the need in most cases to transport the container to a separate cargo examination station for x-ray style screening. By eliminating container transfers for non-threat cargo companies will say money in associated inspection and transport fees and avoid delays that could cause a shipment to miss its scheduled vessel call and delivery time.
Meanwhile, there are other signs that the Hong Kong pilot program is finally getting some high-level attention.
SAIC is also pushing DHS to recognize the project and recently briefed officials within the department's new Domestic Nuclear Detection Office. Flynn said he recently received a positive response toward the program when he addressed liner associations and chambers of commerce in Hong Kong.
And the container screening system recently picked up an important provisional endorsement from an influential association representing liner carriers that serve the U.S. market. Chris Koch, president of the World Shipping Council, said in a recent speech that the technology shows enough promise for inspecting all containers entering port facilities without significant disruption to container traffic that DHS should carefully consider whether it can improve current screening methods.
'There is reason to believe that container inspection technology may be evolving to the point that it could be deployed in the foreseeable future to allow radiation and (non-intrusive) inspection of all containers,' Koch said July 22 at the AFL-CIO's Maritime Trades Department convention in Chicago.
'If this were to prove true, and if the radiation and image readings are of sufficient quality for security screening purposes, this capability would allow a new and significantly more effective supply chain security strategy to be deployed.
'Such capability could enable DHS and other governments to 'flex' their security screening capabilities, to inspect more containers, even from a remote location, without having to inconvenience terminal operators or other customs authorities, and to more effectively handle a response' to an attack or potential threat by analyzing every container image if necessary, Koch said.
'If the technology works, the next step should be to determine how the information produced by this technology would be used. That will be more complicated, but would also seem achievable,' Koch said, adding that terminals would be willing to set up the detection systems if there were 'a clear U.S. government desire to obtain such a capability.
'More challenging is to determine how the technology's readings and images would be used and analyzed, by whom and when,' he said.
'While there are real and legitimate issues that need to be addressed in considering this technology and its possible deployment, the capability for government to call up and review radiation and (non-intrusive inspection) images of any container before vessel loading without delaying commerce could provide a quantum improvement in security capabilities.
'In fact, if it works, it could allow governments the flexibility to change their strategies in a way that would provide increased security assurance for all legitimate commerce,' Koch said.
Flynn said the SAIC system 'isn't the final answer.' Other technologies are available, but the system has an open architecture that allows other systems to be added once the process is fully developed, he said.
Large transshipment ports such as Hong Kong would be industry drivers for the new type of security regime because of the insurance it could provide for continuity of operations following an attack in another part of the global supply chain.
'It changes the paradigm from relying strictly on intelligence,' Flynn said.